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Abstract 
 
Studies of ‘national integrity systems’ are part of the new international concern with corruption and 
its prevention. Alan Doig and Stephanie McIvor coordinated studies of 18 countries, and reflected 
on their method in Public Administration and Development (2003). This article compares their 
conclusions with an overview of a subsequent study of 12 small island states in the South Pacific 
using the same method.  Though the sample was not chosen with scale in mind, smallness may 
explain some of the similarities between the Pacific Island cases, particularly the risks associated 
with offshore financial centres, trust funds and investments.  Their relative size and weakness has 
also made them targets for direct intervention by Australian police and officials to rebuild anti 
corruption institutions.  The article goes on to show how the evidence from the Pacific Island cases 
raises questions about some of the standard proposals for anti corruption reform: stronger parties, 
an ICAC, civil society coalitions and greater accountability and transparency. 
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The idea of a ‘national integrity system’ (NIS) was invented by Transparency 
international, the anti-corruption NGO.  It is pictured as a Greek temple, consisting of 
a number of pillars – legislature, executive, civil society, and so on – which together 
uphold integrity, the opposite of corruption (Pope 2000).  For TI, studies of national 
integrity systems identify opportunities for reform. Aid donors and international 
agencies, who now see corruption as an obstacle to development, fund NIS studies in 
developing countries. TI’s ‘national chapters’, private consulting firms, and 
universities interested in research opportunities are ready to carry them out.  There are 
now 52 NIS reports on TI’s website, and more are under way (Transparency 
International 2005) 
 
This article compares the results of two sets of NIS studies.  The first covered 18 
countries, and was funded by the Dutch government. It was coordinated by TI’s 
Berlin HQ and Alan Doig and Stephanie McIvor from the Teeside Business School. 
They reflected on the virtues of the NIS approach in Public Administration and 
Development, arguing that it provided ‘depth to any assessment of the causes and 
consequences of corruption’ (2003: 329). The second, modeled on the first, was 
coordinated by TI’s national chapter in Australia, particularly Peter Rooke, and 
ourselves at the Australian National University. This ‘NISPAC’ study covered 12 
small island states in the South Pacific, and was funded by the AusAID, Australian 
government’s foreign aid agency. 
 
This article identifies some common themes across the 12 NISPAC reports, compares 
them with Doig and McIvors’s conclusions, asks if they are a consequence of the 
countries’ smallness, and questions some of the NISPAC conclusions about ‘what is 
to be done’.    
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The Pacific Islands as a region 
 
Doig and McIvor included a mix of countries, large and small, from around the world. 
The Pacific Islands constitute a more sharply focussed ‘region’ in several senses 
relevant to corruption and its prevention. First, they share a common history and, in 
Polynesia particularly, a culture of deference to chiefly authority. All but one country, 
Tonga, was brought under colonial rule, and most were decolonised between 1962-
1980.  
 
Second, they form groupings within regional and international organisations that have 
been pressing ‘good governance’ on their members. The Asian Development Bank 
has been pressing public sector reform on its island members. The OCED, though its 
financial action task force, has been pressing Nauru, Niue, Marshall Islands and Cook 
Islands to clean up their offshore financial centres (only Nauru remains on its black 
list of ‘non-cooperating countries’, Financial Action Task Force 2005).  The 
Commonwealth is less demanding but its Secretariat funds islands officials on an anti-
corruption training course in Canberra. The Pacific Islands Forum – an organisation 
of regional governments, including Australia and New Zealand - has been 
encouraging its island members them to improve their systems of accountability. 
 
Third, they are defined as a region by powerful neighbours. The US influences its 
former colonies north of the equator through defence agreements and budget support 
through a recently renegotiated ‘Compact of Free Association’. The recently 
renegotiated Compact now includes stronger, US-based, provisions to audit grants. 
Australia has begun to intervened directly in the affairs of its neighbours, including its 
former colonies, PNG and Nauru.  In 2003 Australia led a regional assistance mission 
(RAMSI) of several hundred troops, police and public servants to restore law and 
order, and rebuild institutions in Solomon Islands. Australian police are now also 
patrolling the streets of PNG’s capital, Port Moresby, though the legality of their 
immunity from prosecution is the subject of a constitutional challenge. Australian 
officials are occupying key positions in government departments there, and in Nauru. 
Each of these interventions has been with the consent of the local government: 
welcoming in Solomon Islands, where requests for intervention had earlier fallen on 
deaf ears, and more grudging in PNG and Nauru.  In a recent speech to parliament, 
the Australian foreign minister talked about ‘fragile’ states in the region, and 
highlighted the NISPAC studies (Downer 2005: 19). 
 
Fourthly, the region offers a kind of ‘natural experiment’, in which the reasons for 
variation in corruption and anti corruption can be identified against a background of 
similarity.  One possible reason is their smallness. It was often argued that Pacific 
Island states were ‘too small’, in functional terms, to become independent on their 
own. Observers from outside the region often argue for some kind of federation, 
shared institutions, or continued ‘free association’ with a former colonial power. So 
smallness is often reached-for to explain present dysfunctions, and regionalism is 
often offered as an answer. These well-established habits of thinking are readily 
applied to the problem of corruption. 
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The pattern of corruption in the Pacific Islands 
 
The NISPAC found suspicion of ministerial favoritism towards relatives in 
appointments, contracts and scholarships. There was abuse of ministerial and official 
travel, and unnecessary travel.  Budget processes were distorted by pet projects and 
what is called, in the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), ‘pitch and catch’ where 
legislators benefit from expenditure they authorise.  
 
The reports found particular sectors and activities like police and customs, more at 
risk than others. Most reports painted a dim picture of the performance of the public 
service. In Kiribati and Nauru, the public service was regarded as a kind of welfare 
system, providing jobs and incomes. In Palau there were frequent exceptions to the 
rules ‘poor administration, bias, abuse and poor accountability’. In Vanuatu the public 
service was described as ‘weak’.  
 
In Solomon Islands there was ‘an almost complete disintegration of state capacity’, 
including misappropriation and embezzlement within the public service. The report 
describes endemic illegal activity and the abuse of discretionary powers in the 
regulation of natural resource exploitation, like forestry and fisheries licensing, and in 
the leasing of government land in Honiara, the capital. 
 
These general problems with the public service affected the police the more so. Police 
are expected to act against corruption, but their own jobs made them particularly 
vulnerable to it. Reports expressed concern about police competence in Cook Islands, 
Kiribati and FSM. Police were tempted by corruption in Tonga.  In Vanuatu there 
were particular tensions following the integration of the police with the paramilitary 
Vanuatu Mobile Force, and several examples of police rebellions.  In Solomon Islands 
a large faction of police led a coup that forced the Prime Minister to resign in 2000, 
leading to the collapse in law and order and, eventually, the Regional Assistance 
Mission.  
 
Political Corruption 
 
In every country, except currently Samoa, parliamentary allegiances are fluid, and 
governments used their powers to create offices, and make appointments to them, to 
shore up or reward political support. Offering executive positions, and hence salaries 
and perks, to MPs is a familiar parliamentary tactic throughout the region. It lies 
behind increases in the size of cabinet in Samoa or the creation of ‘Special Advisors’ 
in Tuvalu (later judged illegal). The report on Tuvalu also notes the suspicion that the 
government appointed a particular MP as Governor General in order to create an 
opportunity for a by-election it hoped to win. In Kiribati a minority government had 
recently asked traditional leaders to allow independent MPs to cross the floor and join 
the government. 
 
Independent or opposition MPs may provide a check on corruption by Ministers, or 
the public servants they are in charge of. In Tonga, a pro Democracy movement began 
with attacks on the disbursements of funds by ministers.   In Samoa the authors 
worried that the ‘unassailable dominance’ of the Human Rights Protection Party in 
might reduce parliament’s ability to oversee the executive. Yet the reports often show 
government and other legislators closing ranks against outside criticism.  
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In Tuvalu visiting Ministers are expected to make gifts to local communities, and 
several court cases in Kiribati have explored the propriety of gifts of tobacco to 
leaders – finding it is expected, even required, of visitors, but not of local 
campaigners (Larmour 1997).  In FSM candidates make ‘strategic donations’. In 
Solomon Islands there have been attempts to normalise these payments through so-
called slush funds, approved by parliament, but not allocated by civil servants, though 
these were being chipped away in donor-sponsored public sector reform campaigns. 
 
 
What is not corrupt? 
 
The story was not all bad. A consistent finding from NISPAC was lack of corruption 
in the national judicial systems. In Solomon Islands, in spite pervasive corruption in 
the public service, the judiciary (for the moment) retained popular approval. However 
there were breaks in the chain of the judicial process in the public prosecutors office, 
and the police. The reports also found electoral administration to be generally clean in 
spite of the absence of independent electoral commissions in most countries.  Yet 
candidates everywhere found themselves under pressure to provide favours to 
constituents in return for votes. 
 
Is it Growing? 
 
The reports are quite precise about the periods when corruption was bad. The 
Solomons report says serious public service corruption began in the late 1980s and 
has continued until the Australian-led military and police intervention in.  Others 
describe periods when corruption was worse than it is now – Vanuatu in the 1990s, 
Samoa until the late 90s and Palau in the period 1979-84.  This precision about dates 
suggests that corruption is not something endemic or inevitable, but the particular and 
perhaps reversible product of historical circumstances. The Samoan authors report the 
editor of the local newspaper saying bluntly ‘corruption has decreased’.  
 
Checks and Balances 
 
The NIS model sees institutions providing checks against corruption in each other. 
The idea of ‘checks and balances’ underlies constitutions modeled on Westminster 
and Washington. Among the NISPAC countries, there were seven parliamentary 
executives and two Presidential systems, two hybrids (Kiribati and Marshall Islands), 
and one monarchy (Tonga, where the King selects Privy councilors whom then 
automatically become members of parliament).  
 
However, the differences between  ‘Westminster’ and ‘Washington’ based systems 
did not seem very great in relation to corruption. There were similar tensions between 
auditors general and the legislature and in the use of public service appointments to 
gain political support.  
 
The NIS points to pillars' tasks of policing themselves. The legislature is vulnerable to 
its own forms of corruption, such as travel funds in Palau. There no leadership codes 
in Cook Islands and FSM. In Tuvalu the Attorney General’s office is working on a 
Leadership Code. The Pacific Islands Forum has attempted to provide a regional 
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standard, but an early detailed draft was replaced by something much vaguer. 
Solomon Islands, ironically, has an elaborate code, and a Leadership Code 
Commission to monitor it. However it has not exercised its powers, partly because of 
under-resourcing, but partly because of its own non-confrontational style of 
leadership (Larmour 2000).  
 
Independent Offices 
 
The NIS model celebrates independent offices. In every country, government auditors 
played a very important role in generating information about poorly managed public 
expenditure, in general, and corruption in particular. Their oversight role was often 
limited by the weakness of parliamentary accounts committees, which failed to read, 
debate or act on their reports. In Kiribati, $20-30 million were found unaccounted for, 
but parliament had not debated the report. Similarly, Vanuatu’s parliament was not 
reading or responding to audit reports. 
 
Legislatures, however, were vigorous in objecting to the appointments of auditors 
who criticized them. In Samoa in the 1990s they had turned on the Sua Rimoni Ah 
Chong, who came from the private sector, and whose reports were highly critical of 
some ministers. There was intense conflict between the auditor and the legislature in 
Palau over criticisms of congressmen’s use of travel funds.  
 
Concern over misuse of the first round of compact funds led the US to create a special 
office of the US General Accounting Office, based in Hawaii, to oversee expenditures 
from the new compacts. The New Zealand auditor general audits Niue’s accounts. 
 
Ombudsmen, set up to deal with citizen complaints against government, were rarer 
than auditors. Where these offices did exist, they seemed relatively invisible and 
ineffective. Samoa had had an ombudsman since 1988 but the NISPAC report found 
not much publicity about its role. A Commissioner for Public Relations in Tonga had 
'so far made little impact’.  The Cook Islands report quotes an earlier Political Review 
Commission finding a 92% dissatisfaction rate with the work of the Ombudsman set 
up in 1984 (though from a tiny sample of self selected respondents).  
 
In any case, waiting for complaints may not be the best way of uncovering corruption. 
The big exception was Vanuatu, where the ombudsman also had the responsibility of 
investigating leadership matters and recommending prosecution, a task vigorously 
taken on by the first incumbent, Marie-Noelle Ferrieux Patterson in the 1990s. So 
vigorous was her reporting that the legislature rescinded the legislation setting up her 
office, which was already provided for in the constitution. However few, if any, of her 
reports were acted upon.  She was  replaced by a quieter figure. 
 
The NISPAC researchers followed a questionnaire used by Doig and McIvor, but we 
added questions about culture, which is often cited as a cause of corruption in the 
region, an excuse for corrupt behaviour, or an impediment to doing something about it. 
Questions were also asked to about corruption within the private sector and NGOs.  
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Culture 
 
Several NISPAC reports pointed to difficulties of translation, or to broader 
disagreements about what counted as corruption, and the seriousness with which it 
mattered. The Tonga report found ‘lack of consensus’ about what counts as corruption. 
In Vanuatu, for example, the word, and concept tended to be applied to bad behaviour 
in non-traditional urban contexts. The report found ambivalence and ‘lack of 
ownership’, and many people did not think it mattered much. Some people saw 
particular political manoeuvres as corrupt. Some saw public and private morality as 
continuous, including ‘personal as well as professional indiscretions’ (Solomon 
Islands). In Vanuatu an unwelcome, but otherwise innocent, new tax on bank 
withdrawals in Vanuatu was criticised by some people as corrupt.  
 
Visible petty corruption – routine small payments for services rendered - was only a 
problem in a few countries (Samoa, Tonga and Palau). Reports and court cases are 
typically seen as the tip of the iceberg. More may be taking place than is ever found 
out. Yet perceptions may work both ways.  Where people are suspicious of 
neighbours, or foreigners, or jealous of their success, they may see more corruption 
than there is. 
 
Many reports described reluctance to act when corruption had taken place. The issue 
here was not relativism, or different understandings. It was more that people were 
fearful of intimidation, or reluctant to rock the boat by public criticism. Some seemed 
simply forgiving, particularly of kin.  These cultural factors were not causing 
corruption to happen, but rather allowing it to continue unchallenged. 
 
Several countries formalise traditional leadership in various kinds of national councils 
of chiefs. The reports did not find much evidence of corruption among these 
organisations. Nor did they seem to be playing much of a role in checking or exposing 
corruption in other parts of the system, so they were not forming a new pillar of the 
NIS, nor (in a phrase from Samoa) a ‘traditional integrity system’. Nor did they seem 
to be concerned about corruption among their members.  
 
 
Civil Society 
 
There were differences between reports about the existence, composition and 
effectiveness of ‘civil society’. Some of the differences were about definitions – 
whether to include traditional organisations, or the private sector in it. But there were 
also real differences about the presence and activity of intermediate groups between 
government and family. This is important for anti corruption strategies, like TI’s 
which depend on a mobilised civil society  
 
There were no citizens groups reported in Kiribati, in spite of the encouragement that 
might have been provided by Section 68 of the constitution, requiring local 
consultation on proposed national legislation. Civil society in Tonga was described as 
‘poorly developed’, as Tongans followed their own family or individual ends.  
 
The reports on Vanuatu, Cook Islands and Solomon Islands by contrast reported a 
diverse ‘civil society’ and the first two included traditional leaders within their 
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definition. Civil society might of course have corruption problems of its own. 
Churches in Kiribati and Samoa collected of relatively large amounts of money in 
donations and spent it on construction work and other activities. The report on 
Vanuatu warned against NGO complacency – seeing themselves as ‘good guys’, they 
had not addressed possibilities of corruption in their own activities. A similar 
complacency might have affected the churches. Recently the General Assembly of a 
church in Kiribati had declared corruption in its own ranks ‘intolerable’ and had laid 
down procedures. Similarly the report on Samoa finds churches having learned from 
past problems of poor accounting. 
 
The Private Sector 
 
TI has succeeded in enlisting some private sector support for the campaign against 
corruption, and in recasting the private sector as a victim as well as perpetrator. 
However the NISPAC the reports point to the small size of the private sector, its 
dependence on government expenditure, its lack of self-organization and the popular 
perceptions that it is something foreign and exploitative. In Marshall Islands the 
private sector ‘had only really emerged recently’. The Solomons report points the 
finger at the private sector as a source of political and public service corruption. It 
blames the Malaysian logging companies that began to harvest timber from customary 
land in the 1980s, and at some members of the Honiara Chinese business community.  
 
 
The Media 
 
The reports consistently show the importance of the media in reporting on corruption. 
A measure is the personal intimidation faced by journalists and publishers in some, 
but not all, countries. In Palau for example the radio reporter Alphonso Diaz has had 
three cars firebombed. An editor in Solomon Islands has been physically intimidated 
by thugs associated with politicians. A publisher has been threatened with violence in 
Vanuatu, and publishers have deported from Vanuatu and Palau.  
 
In some countries formal controls are strong. The government either owns the media, 
or regulates it closely (for example in Samoa the Publishers and Printers act does not 
allow a journalist to protect sources, and requires they be named). In Tuvalu the report 
describes how the media were ‘ruthlessly and heavily censored’.  In Tonga, the 
government has amended the constitution to allow it to ban newspapers and says it is 
concerned about scandal concerning the royal family in its recent attacks on freedom 
of the press. Government motives in muzzling the press, of course, go wider a simple 
desire to cover up corruption.  
 
However, a privately owned press is not necessarily more critical In Solomon Islands 
the press was said to be ‘free but docile’. Its ‘narrow ownership base’, and publisher’s 
links within the elite, led to self-censorship. Paradoxically, the government owned 
SIBC provided more persistent independent criticism. 
 
Comparisons between the NISPAC and  Doig/ Mc Ivor studies 
 
Doig and McIvor found that the NIS ‘pillars’ were in place, but often failed to do 
what they were supposed to (2003: 321). NISPAC found the same – in fact the 
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country with the most elaborate system, Solomon Islands, had the worst problems. Its 
NISPAC author talked of ‘hollow pillars’.  Both sets of reports found failures of the 
pillars to police themselves, let alone act as checks on each other.  
 
The executive dominance that Doig and McIvor found in their 18 countries was less 
marked in the NISPAC countries, though the Tuvalu report found a government 
intolerant of criticism, and the Samoa report worried about single party dominance.  
 
Doig and McIvor found democracy often resting on older structures of power, and 
creating new opportunities for corruption itself, in matters such as party funding, 
election campaigning, and gaining support in parliament. In some Pacific Island 
political systems traditional elites are reproducing themselves in the government, as 
chiefs become Presidents (Amata and his successor Imata Kabua in Marshall Islands). 
Or legislators behave like chiefs (FSM). Education, and in some cases literacy 
distinguish an urban elite from the majority in the outer islands. There is not much 
that outsiders can do about corruption within the elite, other than populist outbursts of 
rage when shops and cars get burned. The internal processes of self-policing within 
the elite (religious or ideological convictions, or a sense of trusteeship on behalf of the 
nation) become as important as any domestic checks and balances. 
 
Doig and McIvor found reasons to be cautious about the impact of decentralisation on 
corruption, particularly in the absence of supervision and trained staff.  
Decentralisation is often demanded in even the smallest of states. Several NISPAC 
reports expressed concern about the possibilities of corruption at local level, where 
supervision was reduced, and the pressures of family and kin might be felt more 
closely. The report on FSM notes differences in legislation and the incidence of 
corruption between the federal and state governments. The Tonga report investigates a 
government away from the centre, in this case Vavau. It notes the additional pressures 
on police and prosecutor in a small town. The report on Marshall Islands described 
problems of missing funds, and unreported licensing in the urban local government 
(MALGOV).  
 
The authors of the NISPAC reports were favourably disposed than Doig and McIvor 
to ‘public sector reform’ promoted by donors and international financial institutions, 
though there were concerns about processes of privatisation, and abuse of new found 
managerial discretion. Doig and Mc Ivor also pointed to the way corruption might 
undermine popular trust in government. The NISPAC reports suggested that 
perceptions are shaped by what has happened in the past.  A buccaneering style of 
politics in Cook Islands and perhaps Samoa seems to have permanently soured people 
against the political system. Cook Islands Political Review Commission found deep 
popular alienation from the political process, while the Samoa NISPAC report found 
continuing suspicion of government. 
 
The author of the Solomon Islands report identifies a particular kind of alienation 
from the state, which he calls ‘insidious tolerance’, in which – on the one hand – 
people come to believe any kind of corruption accusation, without looking for 
evidence, and - on the other hand - accept it as inevitable.  This is not some traditional 
hangover, or example of different cultural understandings, but the learned experience 
of a period of corruption that began in the 1980s, and intensified in the four years 
leading up to the RAMSI intervention in 2003.  But ‘insidious tolerance’ does not 
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seem to have lead to complete disengagement – the report also reports on a very 
active civil society in Solomon Islands. 
 
Smallness 
 
Doig and McIvor point to the need to assess corruption in different types of states, 
including ‘small island’ states (ibid: 329). The NISPAC study happened to include 12 
very small states. The average population of these twelve countries is 103,000 - 
ranging from Solomon Islands with 448,000 to Niue with 1,900 (South Pacific 
Commission 2000).  The median is about 50,000. The two largest states in the region, 
PNG and Fiji had already been separately surveyed (Fiji in Doig and McIvor’s project, 
and PNG separately). The Polynesian and Micronesian islands are mostly atolls, with 
very small land areas (and hence high population densities, even if their absolute  
population size is small). How much is the pattern of corruption and anti corruption 
identified in NISPAC to do with these countries’ smallness? 
   
The 12 NISPAC countries were not selected because they were small, and smallness 
is not a particular issue in the NIS model.  Their selection had more to do with 
Australian regional interests, and the absence of TI groups to coordinate or fund 
research in all but two of them. Nevertheless, the NIS approach expects to find a gap 
between theory and practice, and to provoke the search for an explanation.  ‘Political 
will’ is often offered as an explanation, but ‘size’ might well be another.  It might be a 
positive or a negative, for corruption, and its prevention. It is often remarked that the 
two ‘success stories’ in anti corruption activity, Hong Kong and Singapore, are city 
states – through each with populations and levels of development large by Pacific 
standards.  
 
There is a significant correlation between population size and TI’s Corruption 
Prevention index, which ranks countries according to how corrupt they are perceived 
to be.  The perceptions are those of firms that advise investors on ‘political risk’ and 
smaller countries tend to be perceived of as less corrupt (Knack and Azfar  2003). The 
correlation could be related to their tendency to trade more than larger ones 
(Brautigam and Woolcock 2001: 9). Studies of the politics and government of small 
states might suggest other explanations (eg Warrington 1998).  The NIS study of Fiji, 
part of Doig and McIvor’s sample, suggested that people may be reluctant to report 
corruption where everyone knows everyone. But among what Herbert Simon called 
the ‘proverbs of administration’, there is usually a plausible counter argument: where 
everyone knows what is going on, it is less easy to avoid detection, and shaming.  
 
In the case of the CPI, Knack and Azfar  (2003) argue that the correlation is a 
spurious result of the availability of data. The CPI is constructed from pre-existing 
reports of the country risk analysts. These analysts report on well and badly governed 
large countries, and on well-governed small countries, but tend to ignore badly 
governed small ones. As TI’s index swells to include more smaller badly governed 
countries, the correlation between population size and corruption, they argue, will 
disappear.  Papua New Guinea, for example, recently joined the index, after its NIS 
study was done. It was ranked at 102 of 145 countries, tied with Eritrea, Philippines, 
Uganda, Vietnam and Zambia.  
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The NISPAC found the worst corruption problems in Solomon Islands, the largest in 
terms of land area, and the most populous of this group of the small.  In this case the 
link between population, land area and corruption was probably through the forest 
industry where the report found an explosion of corruption as foreign timber 
companies bribed intermediaries to get access to timber.   But to really disengangle 
the effect of smallness from other factors we would have to include bigger spread of 
countries, large and small.  
 
An earlier study of corruption in the South Pacific (Larmour 1997) found a link 
between smallness and corruption in the trade in tokens of sovereignty. While 
constitutionally independent, small states depend heavily on bilateral aid donors and 
international organisations to fund their functions. In this sense they are what Jackson 
(1990) called ‘quasi states’. These international relations provide openings and 
opportunities for corruption, just as recently they have become conduits for the 
promotion of anti corruption. 
 
Trade in Tokens of Sovereignty 
 
One answer to the absence of resources is to trade in the tokens of sovereignty itself – 
postage stamps, passports, and in the case of Tuvalu, an internet domain name. The 
NISPAC report describes how in Tuvalu, officials and ministers have attempted to 
market the domain name, ".tv" , that the country owns as a member of the relevant 
international organisation. For a while the country was also trading on different rates 
for international telephone lines as a staging point for phone sex calls originating, and 
being heard, in the US. 
 
In a postmodern way the country is a country in name only, but that name is a 
commmodity. It is fertile ground for corruption. In Cook Islands in the 1970s, for 
example, the state agency charged with selling postage stamps to collectors (rather 
than people posting letters in Cook Islands) became a slush fund for the government’s 
election campaigning. The sale of passports was the founding issue for Tonga’s pro 
Democracy movement, and there have been scandals over passport sales in Fiji and 
Samoa. There is often a thin line between individual misbehaviour by officials and 
ministers, or legal government projects to fast-track investment by offering 
citizenship.  
 
Similar issues arise for offshore financial centres, which (for example) Britain 
encouraged Vanuatu to set up in the 1970s, in the absence of prospects for domestic 
revenue.  Cook Islands OFC was an issue in a long running ‘winebox’ scandal in New 
Zealand, over a New Zealand company’s use of accounts in Cook Islands to reduce its 
tax burden. In the late 1990s the OCED became worried about leakage of taxes to 
OFCs. More recently, since 9/11 their concern has been sharpened over money 
laundering. 
 
Very small countries also may lack opportunities to invest their own resources 
domestically. When they must invest abroad, beyond domestic supervision, they may 
make wrong or corrupt decisions. Kiribati has a well-managed overseas investment 
arm, though is always under pressure to consume earnings from it, rather than reinvest 
it. Tuvalu successfully proposed to donors that they put their aid into a fund that 
would provide a regular stream of income to the government (Duncan Hunt and 
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Larmour 1995). Nauru, however, has a longer tradition of ministerial involvement in 
day to day offshore investment decisions where again it is hard to distinguish 
individual acts of corruption from those of mismanagement, or poor collective 
judgement. Certainly its offshore investments have been plagued with suspicion of 
kickbacks, and corruption by middlemen and advisers, leading to the fiscal crisis that 
has provoked intervention by Australian officials.  
 
 
What is to be done? 
 
The authors of the NISPAC reports were academics and former officials selected, by 
and large, for their knowledge of particular countries, rather than any particular 
expertise in corruption, or its prevention. The remedies they came up with tended to 
be fairly standard, like the ‘first wave’ of reforms in eastern Europe (Michael 2004): 
an independent commission, a national strategy, and so on. Yet the internal evidence 
from the reports is at cross-purposes with their recommendations for stronger political 
parties, an ICAC, coalition strategies and more accountability. 
 
Political Parties? 
 
Several reports, despairing of the fluidity of non-partisan politics, and vote buying in 
elections, propose that strong political parties would help reduce opportunities for 
corruption. Ideologically based parties might create a reason for voters to choose apart 
from the material benefits promised by candidates. Once elected, parties might limit 
the maneuvering and promising required to stitch together a government, and the flow 
of resources across the floor to maintain ‘confidence’ in the government. They might 
reduce the tendency of legislatures to close ranks outside criticism, for example from 
auditors of their travel expenses. PNG, for example, has introduced legislation 
designed to strengthen parties against floor crossers, and independent candidates. 
 
However the Samoa report also points to the contrary danger of too strong a party. 
The Human Rights Protection Party has now been in power since the late 1980s, and 
the report expresses fear that its dominance may allow corruption to flourish 
unchecked. Parties suffer their own internal vulnerability to corruption over such 
matters as misappropriation of funds, influence peddling, and vote buying (as recent 
scandals in Germany have shown). The Kiribati report mentioned concern about 
foreign funding of parties. Party advisers regularly try to interfere with public service 
decisions, as in Vanuatu. 
 
An ICAC? 
 
Several reports recommended an ICAC on the Hong Kong or Sydney models.  Doig 
(1995) and others have argued for the usefulness of an ICAC as a focus of anti 
corruption activity, and donor support for it.  Creating them helps symbolise 
government commitments.  But other evidence in the reports does cast doubt on the 
value of independent stand-alone agencies, such as auditors general ombudsmen or 
leadership code commissioners in the region. 
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The reports’ discussions of election commissions also cast doubt about stand-alone 
independent institutions from the other direction. They generally find elections to be 
clean, in spite of the absence of independent election commissions in most countries. 
As we have seen, senior appointments in these countries are often made to reward 
political support – the position of anti-corruption commissioner may end up being just 
such a resource. At a minimum, parliament and the executive, rather than overseeing 
each other, have a common interest in appointing independent bodies that will not 
make waves.  
Maybe each of these independent institutions could and should do better. Vanuatu’s 
feisty leadership code commissioner may set an example, rather than acting as the 
exception that proves the rule. Next time, perhaps, the designers will get it right, but 
the overall record suggests caution in creating yet another independent agency. 
There is also an opportunity cost in creating new institutions – resources, including 
political attention and donor support, come from somewhere else that suffers. Second, 
the resources available to such agencies are relatively small. They must pick and 
choose their fights. The bulk of anti corruption activity, or inactivity, continues to take 
place in large spending departments, the public service and the police.  Third, as a 
new pillar, they generate new problems of horizontal accountability. They get caught 
in turf wars, and must ensure their own internal integrity.  
 
Coalition strategies? 
 
TI has a lively organisation in Vanuatu, and a newly formed group in Solomon 
Islands. There was interest expressed at public forums in Tonga and Samoa, where 
early drafts of the country reports were discussed. TI’s global strategy is based on the 
idea of coalitions of public, private and NGO sectors. It doubts that governments 
alone can reform themselves. It also emphasizes education and prevention over 
investigation and prosecution – the latter involving legal powers in any case not 
available to NGOs. What do the reports suggest about the prospects for such a 
strategy? 
 
First, civil society – depending on how broadly it is defined – is unevenly developed 
between countries. A major component, the churches, has been reluctant to criticise 
governments. In Samoa and Kiribati they have also recognized the need to put their 
own house in order.  
 
Second both civil society and the private sector is relatively disorganized. The 
Vanuatu reports criticize civil society for lack of coordination and ‘ reinventing the 
wheel’. The Tonga report finds Tongans particularistic, and reluctant to join 
organizations outside the family. The private sector has not shown much capacity for 
self-organisation, except perhaps in Tonga. There is a Chamber of Commerce in FSM, 
but Tuvaluan business would be reluctant to pay the fees necessary to join one. 
 
Accountability and Transparency? 
 
In Marshall Islands accountability was seen as the necessary precondition for dealing 
with corruption. Votes of No Confidence, for example, are a way in which the 
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legislature in Westminster systems is meant to hold the executive to account. In 
parliaments without strong party or ideological identifications, however, the threat of 
such a vote may become, as it has in Solomon Islands, simply another way for non-
government MPs to extract resources or positions from the executive. Similarly the 
reports on Solomon Islands and Cook Islands notice the bad effects of putting 
Permanent Secretaries or Heads of Ministries on contracts, making them more 
accountable to ministers (at the cost, they say, or independence and competence) 
 
The international community, including of course TI, strongly promotes transparency.  
However, the reports show that not all corruption is hidden, particularly petty 
corruption, and the corruption associated with elections, or deals on the floor of 
parliament. Several reports point out that in small-scale societies everyone knows – or 
thinks they know - what is going on. Opacity is not the problem, but different 
understandings, reluctance or intimidation. However, when that activity takes place 
abroad – during trips overseas, or in offshore investments – that steady local scrutiny 
is absent, though the gossip continues.  
 
The reports generally suggest accountability and transparency may be of limited use if 
civil society or ordinary members of the public aren’t willing or able to do much 
about what is going on. In Vanuatu many people saw corruption as something only 
associated with the modern urban sector and of little importance to them. In other 
cases the public seems complicit: in Tuvalu, for example, ministers are subject to 
pressure from voters to change shipping schedules in their favor. Several reports find 
the public acquiescent, cynical or merely forgiving.  
 
Conclusions 
 
There seems to be a distinctive pattern of corruption and anti corruption in the Pacific 
Islands, compared to the more heterogeneous group of countries studied by the same 
methods by Doig and McIvor. Some, but not all of those differences, may have to do 
with their smallness in population and land area. Smallness generates particular risks 
of corruption (for example in offshore activities) and also particular types of anti 
corruption activity (for example involving the regional and multilateral organisations 
of which they are members). The principles underlying the NIS – of mutual 
supervision between various institutions, checks and balances, independent offices– 
seem to run into difficulty when applied at a very small and personal scale. 
Proliferating offices may be impossible to resource or staff adequately, and 
independence more difficult to achieve.  Other anti-corruption principles than ‘checks 
and balances’ may have to be looked for.  Anti-corruption activity may also become 
more international.  RAMSI has introduced a new layer of outside involvement in anti 
corruption, at least in Solomon Islands.  Since RAMSI began eighty-eight police 
officers have been charged with corruption, murder or other serious crimes and about 
25% of the force removed from office  (Wainwright 2005: 3). No deadline has been 
set for RAMSI’s withdrawl, and officials talk of it being in place for ‘five to ten 
years’.  
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